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From beach volleyball and soccer 
to tennis and golf to playoffs for 
the Little League World Series, 
tournament play has lessons for 
workplace compensation. It was 
actually a 1989 presentation by Cornell’s Ronald Ehrenberg 
of his paper co-authored with Michael Bognanno called “Do 
Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?” that inspired me to 
study compensation. I was a college sophomore in Amherst, 
Mass., and the idea of paying not on the absolute level of 
output (sell 100 widgets and get paid $100) but on the rela-
tive level of output (sell more than everyone else and get 
paid $1,000) sounded incredibly interesting.
The Classic Paper
The classic tournament paper by Edward Lazear and Sherwin 
Rosen is now more than 30 years old. The paper, “Rank-
Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,” was 
published in the Journal of Political Economy in October 
1981. Lazear and Rosen theoretically examine a situation 
where individuals are paid on the basis of their rank among 
a group and not necessarily on their output, a useful struc-
ture in situations where it is difficult and/or expensive to 
measure individual effort well. An important characteriza-
tion of the tournament payment structure, they note, is that 
payment (winning the prize) depends on the rank order and 
not the “distance” between the individuals’ performances. 
So if one individual narrowly wins the first place prize, he/
she gets exactly the same prize as if the gap is vast between 
that of the winner and that of the second place finisher.
Among their findings: When workers are “risk neutral” 
(gain no thrill from the potential of winning or anxiety from 
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got a
question
the fear of losing), a payment scheme based on rank can 
elicit precisely the same level of effort from workers as a 
payment scheme perfectly matched to individual effort; this 
means piece-rate pay. A tournament scheme can motivate 
workers the same if workers are risk neutral. Lazear and 
Rosen also showed that: 1) when workers are risk averse, 
as many are, there are some circumstances when workers 
might actually prefer to be paid based on rank, 2) the level 
of effort a worker puts forth in a tournament depends on 
the size of the prize (e.g., level of promotion and size of 
associated raise) and 3) breaking employees (players) into 
groups of more similar quality (e.g.,  leagues) has further 
useful outcomes. Their seminal paper put forth a lot of 
interesting findings and launched a host of empirical work. 
Payments in Sports Tournaments
A rich place to study tournament pay, performance, output, 
effort and the like is professional golf, because so much is 
measured. Great data are available on the incentive struc-
ture; for example, the distance in dollars between the first 
place price and the second place prize, and the distance in 
dollars between the second place prize and the third place 
prize, and so on. And, a lot is known about individuals’ 
output (players’ scores), and even course difficulty and 
playing conditions.
Ehrenberg and Bognanno’s paper, published in the Journal 
of Political Economy in 1990, studied the Professional Golf 
Association tours and found strong evidence that the level 
and structure of the prize system has meaningful effects on 
player performance. After controlling for all sorts of details 
about player quality, weather, course difficulty and a host of 
other characteristics, they find that the bigger the prizes (all 
else equal) the lower the scores, and the higher the “marginal 
return to effort” leading to a lower score in final rounds. 
Lower scores are good in golf, so this means that where there 
are bigger awards in tournaments, players do better.
Tournament Compensation in Workplace Practice
Since these early path-breaking publications, researchers 
have studied many topics related to tournament pay in the 
workplace, including CEO productivity, gender equity and 
disincentive possibilities in “repeated tournaments” such 
as you’d find in ongoing or repeated work for the same 
company. Research has also expanded to study the effects 
of more sophisticated or blended tournaments such as the 
piece-rate tournament where the payment is based on some 
calculation of the difference between an individual’s perfor-
mance and the average performance of a larger group. 
One such study looks at the contract payment data in 
the market for broiler chickens. It turns out that in the 
U.S. broiler chicken market, independent farmers are orga-
nized by large processing companies and paid based on 
relative performance through a piece-rate tournament. 
(See Armando Levy’s and Tomislav Vukina’s “The League 
Composition Effect in Tournaments With Heterogeneous 
Players: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Contracts” in the 
April 2004 Journal of Labor Economics.) The authors of this 
tournament pay study emphasize that individuals could face 
very different odds of doing well and earning a tournament 
payoff based on whether, because of random assignment, 
they face a much better or much worse competitor early 
in the tournament. Many sports tournaments use seeding 
to lessen this apparent random “luck of the draw.” Among 
Levy’s and Vukina’s findings: There may be gains to tourna-
ments over piece rates, but complexities like assignment of 
competitors (leagues) and the effect of repeated tourna-
ments must be considered.
Glengarry Glen Ross
One of my favorite examples of a compensation tourna-
ment comes from the movie adaptation of David Mamet’s 
Pulitzer Prize winning (1984) play, “Glengarry Glen Ross.” 
In the 1992 movie version, a new character was created and 
Alec Baldwin played the role. In it, he screams at a team of 
salespeople, confronting them with their new compensation 
system. The new pay scheme is a tournament (although he 
doesn’t use that word) with a first, second and third place 
prize. First place prize is a Cadillac El Dorado, while second 
place prize is a set of steak knives and third place prize 
is “You’re fired.” This new compensation system obviously 
gets employees’ attention, and it does seem to motivate. But 
obviously, it also creates serious problems. 
